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kapitel 19 the rule of law and european environmental policy
1 Introduction
Access to justice is the key-word in any legal order based upon 
the ‘Rule of Law’. The fi rst time I met Gerd Winter, was in his capacity as 
Anwalt‘ ’ in the saga of the Kernkraft Lingen case.1 With compelling and persua-
sive arguments he managed, against mainstream German legal doctrine, to con-
vince the Bundesverwaltungsgericht that the ‘Jedermann-Verfahren’ of the German 
Atomgesetz, indeed means that Jedermann = Jedermann and that individuals 
living outside German territory must be granted access to the decision-making 
process under the same conditions as those living on German territory. And that 
licenses granted on the basis of the Atomgesetz can be challenged by ‘foreigners’ 
in a court of law as well.
In the Preamble of the EU Treaty the Member States have confi rmed ‘their 
attachment to the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law’. Art. 220 EC states further 
that ‘the Court of Justice shall ensure that in the interpretation and application 
of this Treaty the law is observed’ and in Art. 230 it is stated that the European 
Court of Justice has jurisdiction ‘on grounds of lack of competence, infringe-
ment of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of this Treaty or of 
any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers’.
Ample reason therefore to look into the question of the ‘challenge-ability’ 
of European Environmental law and policy. Is there a genuine judicial review 
possible by the ECJ in case the European institutions take decisions affecting 
the environment? And what, if any, is the role of ‘ordinary’ citizens, like the 
Jugendherbergs-Vater mr. Hamers in the Kernkraft Lingen case?
2 Actions against Decisions
Actions by individuals against Decisions of the Council or 
the Commission are in principle admissible in Article 230 EC proceedings. 
Although the implementation of EC environmental law is largely a matter for 
the Member States, the Commission can increasingly be seen to possess powers 
to take decisions in the fi eld of or related to the environment. Sometimes these 
powers are conferred by the Treaty, in other cases by secondary legislation.
An example where the Commission derives its powers from the Treaty is provided 
by the provisions relating to state aid (Articles 87 and 88 EC). These articles are 
also relevant for the assessment of national aid for the protection of the environ-
ment. They give the Commission the power to approve national environmental 
1  See J.H. Jans, Grenzüberschreitendes Umweltrecht, Köln 1990.
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aids, not to approve them or to make aid subject to certain conditions, and other, 
more procedural decisions can also be taken.
Another example is provided by the Treaty provisions on competition law (Articles 
81 and 82 EC). In practice, it has become clear that certain practices of undertak-
ings, even when they concern environmental protection, can confl ict with Treaty 
provisions. Here too, the Commission has the power to take decisions.
As far as the Commission’s powers under secondary legislation are concerned, 
particular reference is made to Regulation 2037/2000 on substances that deplete 
the ozone layer.2 This provides that a license issued by the Commission is required 
for the release into free circulation in the Community of certain ozone depleting 
substances (Article 6). Article 7 of Directive 2001/18 concerning the deliberate 
release into the environment of genetically modifi ed organisms3 is another exam-
ple. This directive also provides for powers, in this case relating to the placing on 
the market of products. Finally, it should be noted that the Commission also has 
powers to fi nance projects in the context of the Structural Funds.4 As provided in 
Article 12 of Regulation 1260/99, such measures must be in keeping with Commu-
nity policies on environmental protection. Here, too, the need may be felt for 
judicial protection against decisions by the Commission which take insuffi cient 
account of European environmental law. In any event, persons to whom decisions 
of the Commission with an environmental impact are addressed may in any event 
appeal under Article 230 EC. Such an appeal must be lodged with the Court of 
First Instance.
With respect to locus standi of individuals we have to distinguish between deci-
sions addressed to the individual itself and decisions addressed to others. The 
text of Article 230 (4) makes is perfectly clear that individuals have, more or less 
automatic, standing against decisions addressed to them.
The following examples can be mentioned. In the case of the Ozone Regula-
tion, it is the importer who should be considered the applicant and the person 
addressed.5 In the case of decisions based on the provisions of Articles 81 and 82 
the undertakings concerned should be regarded as the persons addressed.
2  OJ 2000 L 244/1.
3  OJ 2001 L 106/1.
4  Regulation 1260/99, OJ 1999 L 161/1.
5  Admissibility is no problem whatsoever: cf. case T-336/94 Efi sol [1996] ECR II-1343.
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In addition to the persons to whom a Decision is addressed, interested parties 
may also be admissible in Article 230 proceedings, if the decision is of direct and 
individual concern to them. 
In the other examples mentioned above it is often the Member State to which the 
decision is addressed. It is the Member State which is given the option of granting 
aid for the protection of the environment or not and it is the Member State which 
can be considered the benefi ciary of structural fund projects. 
Sometimes a Decision is addressed to other individuals. In those cases ‘competi-
tors’ can feel the need to challenge the Decision.
The case law on this point can briefl y be summarized as follows: an interested 
party is admissible if he is affected by the decision in a manner which distin-
guishes him from others. While the Community was more or less exclusively 
aimed at market integration, this criterion was suffi cient. Where an importer, 
exporter or other market participant was affected in his particular private 
interests, the criterion of direct and individual concern would distinguish him 
from all other market participants. This means that where an ‘environmental 
decision’ of the Commission affects a market-participant in his private market 
interests, there will often be no problem as regards admissibility. 
A case in point is the judgment of the Court of First Instance in Waterleiding Maat-
schappij ‘Noord-West Brabant’ NV v. Commission.6 The case involved a decision 
of the Commission not to open formal procedures under the state aid rules of the 
Treaty against certain environment-related tax reliefs in Dutch law. With respect to 
some of the tax reliefs the Court found that they directly affected the structure of 
the market in which the applicant operated and therefore affected its competitive 
position on that market. The applicant therefore had to be regarded as directly 
and individually concerned by the contested decision of the Commission. 
The same line of reasoning can probably be applied in the case of Article 81(3) 
exemptions, for example in the context of an environmental agreement where 
competitors who consider themselves disadvantaged would probably be admis-
sible. 
The judgment of the Court in case C-295/92 points in this direction.7 This case 
concerned the intention of the Dutch parliament to adapt taxes on fossil fuels in 
such a way that the energy content and the carbon content would each count for 
6  Case T-188/95 Waterleiding Maatschappij ‘Noord-West Brabant’ NV v. Commission [1998] ECR II-3713.
7  Case C-295/92 Landbouwschap v. Commission [1992] ECR I-5003.
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half. The measure contained a number of exemptions, including one for large-
scale industrial users. The measure had been notifi ed to the Commission as state 
aid within the meaning of Article 87(1). The Commission considered the measure 
compatible with the common market. The Dutch Agricultural Association (Land-
bouwschap) considered the exemption for large-scale industrial users unlawful and 
lodged an appeal. There was a background of many years of discussion about the 
price of gas for the glasshouse sector. The Court of Justice declared the Associa-
tion inadmissible, because the aid in question would only benefi t a group of large 
industrial undertakings, which were not in competition with either the Association 
or the glasshouse farmers it represented. According to the Court, the interests of 
the Association would not be affected in any way whether the Commission deci-
sion was upheld or annulled. A contrario, it could be inferred from this that if an 
interested third party is in direct competition and the interests of the third party 
have been affected by a decision, an appeal would be admissible.
In the light of this case law, the legal protection of this category of individuals 
would probably cause few problems. The most important condition is that there 
must be a competitive relationship between the party ultimately benefi ting from 
the decision and the party lodging the appeal. 
Much more complicated is the admissibility of individuals who object to a 
Commission decision on environmental grounds. Here there are no private and 
thus specifi c interests at issue but, on the contrary, the public interest. The case 
law mentioned above, which required that a person’s interests be specifi cally 
affected cannot, almost by defi nition, fulfi l a distinguishing function here. After 
all, the key feature of the public interest is that it is universal, applicable to all. If 
the criterion of direct and individual concern is applied with full force this must 
inevitably produce the paradoxical result that the more serious the infringement 
(the harm to the environment) and the wider the group potentially affected the 
less is the likelihood that the criterion can be met.8 The judgments of the CFI 
and the ECJ discussed below show that both these courts have fallen into this 
paradoxical trap. The leading case on the admissibility of interested third parties 
trying to annul decisions affecting the environment is still the Greenpeace case.9
This case concerned two power stations on the Canary Islands, for which no 
environmental impact assessment had been prepared. Greenpeace had appealed 
against a decision of the Court of First Instance.10 That Court had declared Green-
8  Cf. Gerd Winter, “Individualrechtsschutz im deutschen Umweltrecht unter dem Einfl uß des Gemein-
schaftsrechts” (1999) NVwZ 467-475.
9  Case C-321/95P Greenpeace v. Commission [1998] ECR I-1651. 
10  Case T-585/93 Greenpeace v. Commission [1995] ECR II-2205. Cf. also case T-117/94 Associazione Agricol-
tori della Provincia di Rovigo and Others v. Commission [1995] ECR II-455 and case C-142/95P Associazi-
one Agricoltori della Provincia di Rovigo and Others v. Commission [1996] ECR I-6669.
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peace’s action seeking annulment of a Commission decision to pay the Spanish 
Government ECU 12 million from the European Regional Development Fund 
for the construction of the two power stations inadmissible. The Court of First 
Instance had reached this decision referring to the settled case law of the Court 
of Justice according to which persons other than the addressees may claim that a 
decision is of direct concern to them only if that decision affects them by reason 
of certain attributes which are peculiar to them, or by reason of factual circum-
stances which differentiate them from all other persons and thereby distinguish 
them individually in the same way as the person addressed. The Court of First 
Instance observed that whilst this case-law concerned essentially cases involving 
economic interests, the essential criterion which it applied remained applicable 
whatever the nature, economic or otherwise, of the applicants’ interests which 
were affected.
Accordingly, the CFI held that the criterion proposed by the applicants for 
appraising their locus standi, namely the existence of harm suffered or to be 
suffered, was not in itself suffi cient to confer locus standi on an applicant. This 
was because such harm might affect, in a general abstract way, a large number 
of persons who could not be determined in advance in such a way as to distin-
guish them individually just like the addressee of a decision, as required under 
the settled case-law mentioned above. There was thus no question of a special 
regime of locus standi in respect of Community environmental decisions, refl ect-
ing the public function of the environment. 
In this regard the Court of First Instance held that the status of a ‘normal’ inter-
ested third party, such as a ‘local resident’, ‘fi sherman’ or ‘farmer’ or of persons 
concerned by the impact which the building of two power stations might have on 
local tourism, on the health of Canary Island residents and on the environment 
did not differ from that of all the people living or pursuing an activity in the areas 
concerned and that the applicants thus could not be affected by the contested 
decision otherwise than in the same manner as any other local resident, fi sher-
man, farmer or tourist who was, or might be in the future, in the same situation.
As far as the locus standi of the organization Greenpeace was concerned, the 
Court of First Instance observed that an association formed for the protection 
of the collective interests of a category of persons could not be considered to be 
directly and individually concerned, for the purposes of the fourth paragraph of 
Article 230 EC, by a measure affecting the general interests of that category, and 
was therefore not entitled to bring an action for annulment where its members 
could not do so individually. On appeal the Court of Justice upheld the decision 
of the Court of First Instance. 
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3 Actions against Directives and Regulations
The protection of individuals against breaches of EC environ-
mental law by public authorities of the Member States or by other individuals, 
through the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy, is largely effected through 
national procedures. However, where an individual objects to the very substance 
of EC environmental law and policy, there are few means of obtaining a remedy 
at national level. Even if the validity of an environmental directive could be chal-
lenged before a national court, under Community law the national court is not 
competent to pronounce on its validity.11 In that case the national court will avail 
itself of the preliminary ruling procedure set out in Article 234 and refer the 
matter to the Court of Justice. The Treaty does not offer individuals any form of 
direct legal protection in such a case.
An example in the case law of the ECJ were individuals, in a preliminary ruling, 
challenged the validity of an environmental directive was the Standley case.12 In the 
Standley case the Court considered the Nitrates Directive. It was argued that this 
directive gave rise to disproportionate obligations on the part of farmers, so that 
it offended against the principle of proportionality. The Court was not impressed. 
After a careful study of the Nitrates Directive it came to the conclusion: ‘that the 
Directive contains fl exible provisions enabling the Member States to observe the 
principle of proportionality in the application of the measures which they adopt. It 
is for the national courts to ensure that that principle is observed.’ This conclusion 
will be applicable to most, if not all, Community environmental legislation. But 
even if the ECJ would declare an environmental directive invalid, this would not 
necessarily imply that the national implementing legislation is invalid too.
Neither will an action for annulment under Article 230 EC offer a solution. 
Actions for the annulment of directives or regulations brought by individuals 
will certainly be ruled inadmissible.13 With respect to Regulation 259/93 on the 
supervision and control of shipments of waste, the ECJ ruled in the Buralux
case that, undertakings specializing in the collection, shipment and dumping 
of household waste cannot be regarded as individually concerned by the provi-
sion in the regulation to take measures to prohibit generally or partially or object 
systematically to shipments of waste, since such undertakings are concerned by 
the provision in question only in their objective capacity as economic operators 
in the sector of waste shipments between Member States in the same way as 
11  Case 314/85 Foto-Frost [1987] ECR 4199.
12  Case C-293/97 Standley [1999] ECR I-2603.
13  Case T-475/93 Buralux v. Council [1994] ECR 3229 and case C-209/94P Buralux v. Council [1996] ECR 
I-615.
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any other operator in that sector, and do not constitute a limited class of identi-
fi ed or identifi able operators who are particularly concerned by that provision 
on account of their special situation. Key words in this judgment are: ‘objective 
capacity’. Most directives and regulations will affect individuals in such a capac-
ity. 
The result of the ‘objective capacity’-doctrine14 is that in general private 
parties do not have locus standi at the ECJ to challenge Regulations and Direc-
tives. How does this doctrine relate to the ‘Rule of Law’?  The Court of Justice 
itself has confi rmed that access to the courts is one of the essential elements 
of a community based on the rule of law and is guaranteed in the legal order 
based on the EC Treaty, inasmuch as the Treaty established a complete system 
of legal remedies and procedures designed to permit the Court of Justice to 
review the legality of acts of the institutions.15 The Court of Justice bases the 
right to an effective remedy before a court of competent jurisdiction on the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States and on Articles 6 and 13 
of the ECHR.16 In addition, the right to an effective remedy for everyone whose 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has been 
reaffi rmed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union proclaimed at Nice on 7 December 2000.17 In the Jégo-Quéré case the 
Court of First Instance found it therefore necessary to consider whether, in a 
case where an individual applicant is contesting the lawfulness of provisions of 
general application directly affecting its legal situation, the inadmissibility of 
the action for annulment would deprive the applicant of the right to an effective 
remedy.18
The case concerned an action for annulment of Articles 3(d) and 5 of Commis-
sion Regulation 1162/2001 establishing measures for the recovery of the stock of 
hake in ICES sub-areas III, IV, V, VI and VII and ICES divisions VIII a, b, d, e and 
associated conditions for the control of activities of fi shing vessels.19 Jégo-Quéré 
is a fi shing company established in France which operates on a regular basis in the 
waters covered by the Regulation. Jégo-Quéré claimed to be the only one fi shing 
on a regular basis in the said waters. Jégo-Quéré argued further that its action for 
annulment is admissible, because otherwise it would leave it without any remedy, 
since no act has been adopted at national level against which legal proceedings 
could be brought. Applying the ‘objective capacity’ approach the CFI  found that 
14  Or as it has been called since Case 25/62 Plaumann [1963] ECR 95; the ‘Plaumann-doctrine’.
15  Case 294/83 Les Verts v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, paragraph 23.
16  Case 222/84 Johnston [1986] ECR 1651, paragraph 18.
17  OJ 2000 C 364/1
18  Case T-177/01 Jégo-Quéré ECR [2002] II-2365.
19  OJ 2001 L 159/4.
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the contested provisions are, by their nature, of general application and that the 
applicant could not be regarded as individually concerned within the meaning of 
Article 230 EC. However, it did not stop there, but discussed the case in the light 
of the applicants right to an effective remedy. According to the CFI, the alterna-
tive route of proceedings before the  national court giving rise to a reference to 
the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC, was unavail-
able in this case, as there were no acts of implementation capable of forming the 
basis of an action before national courts. ‘The fact that an individual affected by 
a Community measure may be able to bring its validity before the national courts 
by violating the rules it lays down and then asserting their illegality in subsequent 
judicial proceedings brought against him does not constitute an adequate means 
of judicial protection. Individuals cannot be required to breach the law in order to 
gain access to justice’ the CFI argued.20 Also the other alternative route (damages 
ex Art. 288 EC) is not available according to the CFI; ‘The procedural route of 
an action for damages based on the non-contractual liability of the Community 
does not, in a case such as the present, provide a solution that satisfactorily 
protects the interests of the individual affected. Such an action cannot result in 
the removal from the Community legal order of a measure which is nevertheless 
necessarily held to be illegal. Given that it presupposes that damage has been 
directly occasioned by the application of the measure in issue, such an action is 
subject to criteria of admissibility and substance which are different from those 
governing actions for annulment, and does not therefore place the Community 
judicature in a position whereby it can carry out the comprehensive judicial review 
which it is its task to perform. In particular, where a measure of general applica-
tion, such as the provisions contested in the present case, is challenged in the 
context of such an action, the review carried out by the Community judicature 
does not cover all the factors which may affect the legality of that measure, being 
limited instead to the censuring of suffi ciently serious infringements of rules of 
law intended to confer rights on individuals’.21 Subsequently the CFI came to the 
inevitable conclusion that the procedures provided for in, Article 234 EC and Arti-
cle 288 EC ‘can no longer be regarded, in the light of Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR 
and of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, as guaranteeing persons 
the right to an effective remedy enabling them to contest the legality of Commu-
nity measures of general application which directly affect their legal situation’. The 
strict interpretation of the notion of ‘individual concern’ of Art. 230 EC had to be 
reconsidered, the CFI argued and developed a new test to be applied: ‘a natural or 
legal person is to be regarded as individually concerned by a Community measure 
20  See also point 43 of the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agri-
cultores v Council ECR [2002] I-6677.
21  Cf. Case C-352/98 P Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission [2000] ECR I-5291, paragraphs 41 to 43 and 
Case T-155/99 Dieckmann & Hansen v Commission [2001] ECR II-3143, paragraphs 42 and 43.
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of general application that concerns him directly if the measure in question affects 
his legal position, in a manner which is both defi nite and immediate, by restricting 
his rights or by imposing obligations on him. The number and position of other 
persons who are likewise affected by the measure, or who may be so, are of no 
relevance in that regard’. And declared Jégo-Quéré admissible to challenge the 
regulation.
However, the new doctrine did not survive for very long. Although scheduled 
for October 2002, the ECJ – during its offi cial vacation – gave judgment in Case 
C-50/00P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council.22
This case involved an appeal against an order23 of the CFI  in by which that court 
dismissed an action for partial annulment of Regulation 1638/98 on the estab-
lishment of a common organisation of the market in oils and fats24. Like in the 
Jégo-Qéré case the applicant in UPA argued that his action vis-à-vis the regulation 
is admissible, in view of the fact that there is no legal remedy under national law 
available to him. Like the CFI, the ECJ acknowledged its commitment to the Rule 
of Law: ‘The European Community is, however, a community based on the rule 
of law in which its institutions are subject to judicial review of the compatibility 
of their acts with the Treaty and with the general principles of law which include 
fundamental rights’ and that ‘individuals are therefore entitled to effective judicial 
protection of the rights they derive from the Community legal order’. However 
according to the system of judicial protection developed by the EC Treaty, where 
natural or legal persons cannot directly challenge Community measures of general 
application, they are able, either indirectly to plead the invalidity of such acts 
before the Community Courts under Article 184 of the Treaty or to do so before 
the national courts and ask them, to make a reference to the Court of Justice for 
a preliminary ruling on validity. Thus it is for the Member States to establish a 
system of legal remedies and procedures which ensure respect for the right to 
effective judicial protection. The ECJ added that in accordance with the principle 
of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 10 EC, national courts are required, 
so far as possible, to interpret and apply national procedural rules governing 
the exercise of rights of action in a way that enables natural and legal persons to 
challenge before the courts the legality of any decision or other national measure 
relative to the application to them of a Community act of general application, by 
pleading the invalidity of such an act. However the absence of national remedies 
do not allow individuals to bring proceedings to contest the validity of Community 
22  Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council, judgement of 25 July 2002, nyr.
23  Case T-173/98 Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [1999] ECR II-3357.
24  OJ 1998 L 210/32.
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measures. ‘Such an interpretation would require the Community Court, in each 
individual case, to examine and interpret national procedural law. That would 
go beyond its jurisdiction when reviewing the legality of Community measures’, 
according to the ECJ. Finally the ECJ argued that, although the condition ‘direct 
and individual concern’ must be interpreted in the light of the principle of effective 
judicial remedy, ‘such an interpretation cannot have the effect of setting aside 
the condition in question, expressly laid down in the Treaty, without going beyond 
the jurisdiction conferred by the Treaty on the Community Courts.’ And to close 
the door, the ECJ concluded that, ‘’while it is, admittedly, possible to envisage a 
system of judicial review of the legality of Community measures of general appli-
cation different from that established by the founding Treaty and never amended 
as to its principles, it is for the Member States, if necessary, in accordance with 
Article 48 EU, to reform the system currently in force.’
This judgment shows that the strict interpretation of ‘direct and individual 
concern’ is still very much at the centre of Article 230, fourth paragraph. Locus 
standi for individuals to challenge at the ECJ environmental regulations and 
directives would require, in the light of the UPA judgment, an amendment of 
the EC Treaty.
4 Conclusion
The case law of the ECJ shows that individuals are deprived of 
any direct legal protection at the ECJ against environmental directives and regu-
lations. In general, individuals would have alternative routes available to them, 
particular at the national level. However the recent judgment of the ECJ in 
UPA shows that in absence of such a national alternative, the ECJ will not open 
the door of Article 230 EC. The de facto result is a loophole in the Community 
system of legal protection and the possibility that some Community measures 
are not subject to judicial review by the ECJ.
Furthermore, the case of the Court shows that the ECJ has failed adequately 
to appreciate that the old remedies, designed to protect private interests, are 
inadequate to protect public goods, such as the environment. As long as European 
law fails to acknowledge, the sombre conclusion must be that legal protection 
against European decisions having signifi cant environmental effects is seriously 
fl awed. This is unworthy of a legal order devoted to the Rule of Law. In UPA
the ECJ made clear that the ball is now in the courtyard of the Member States 
as Herren der Verträge. We have to wait to see the results until the next round of 
Treaty-negotiations have been completed.
